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COMPUTER PROGRAMS AS LITERARY WORKS AND AS
MODES OF OPERATION: A CASE COMMENT ON LOTUS V.
BORLAND
JEFFREY BRILL*

INTRODUCTION

The distinction between the copying of literal and nonliteral

elements of computer programs raises several interesting and, as yet,
not clearly settled copyright infringement questions. Congress has

legislated that computer programs constitute literary works and, as
such, are the subject of copyright protection.' As courts have held, 2 a
line by line copying of the source or object code of a computer
program clearly constitutes copyright infringement. At the same time,
the Copyright Act stipulates that no copyright protection exists for
"any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, [or]
concept."3 While computer programs often have creative elements,

they are obviously more utilitarian in nature than traditional literary
works. Since perhaps every nonliteral element of a computer program
constitutes an "idea, procedure, process, system, method of

operation, [or] concept," the appropriate amount of copyright
protection to extend to the copying of nonliteral elements of
computer programs is unclear. The holding in Lotus Development
Corp. v. Borland International,Inc. 4 indicates that perhaps the correct
* Juris Doctor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 1998. The
author is an associate at Fenwick & West LLP in Palo Alto, California. The author wishes to
thank Professor Mickie Voges for reviewing and commenting on this work.
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1994) (instructing that literary works are the subject of
copyright protection); id. § 101 (defining "literary works" as "works ...expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as books ... tapes, disks ... in which they are embodied"); see also H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 ("The term 'literary
works' . . . includes ... computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the
programmer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.").
2. See CCMS Software Design Sys., Inc. v. Info Designs, Inc., 785 F.2d 1246, 1247 (5th Cir.
1986); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47, 1249 (3d Cir.
1983); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Attic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1982); Stern Elecs.,
Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
4. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
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answer is none.
In Lotus, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the
menu hierarchy of the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program is not eligible
for copyright protection because it is a "method of operation."5 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari 6 and affirmed the decision of the
First Circuit by an equally divided court in a two sentence opinion
without elucidation.7 Because the Supreme Court affirmed the First
Circuit's holding in Lotus without any explanation, the current status
of the law remains unclear. Without further clarification from the
Supreme Court, only the most narrow, straightforward reading of the
First Circuit's judgment is authoritative. Specifically, the Lotus court
held only that the menu hierarchy in the Lotus 1-2-3 computer
program is not subject to copyright protection because it is a method
of operation. The First Circuit did not state that all nonliteral
elements of computer programs fall into the categories excluded from
protection by the Copyright Act. 9 In fact, the First Circuit implied the
opposite by indirectly acknowledging the Second Circuit's
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison ("A-F-C") test 10 for determining
copyright infringement of nonliteral elements of computer
programs.11 The Second Circuit had formulated this test in Computer
Associates International,Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,"2 thereby indicating a belief
that nonliteral elements of computer programs could be the subject of
13
copyright protection.
Nonetheless, the First Circuit's reasoning in Lotus and the
Supreme Court's minimalist affirmation of that case imply that the
copying of nonliteral elements of computer programs might never
constitute copyright infringement. This comment argues that such an
interpretation of Lotus results in the appropriate legal treatment of
computer programs. Part I of this comment provides a brief technical
5. Id. at 815.
6. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 515 U.S. 1191 (1995).
7. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
8. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815.
9. See id.
10. For the Second Circuit's articulation of this test, see ComputerAssociates International,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-11 (2d Cir. 1992).
11. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 814-15 (considering the Second Circuit's test and holding that it is
not applicable to the instant fact pattern).
12. 982 F.2d at 706-11.
13. The fact that the Second Circuit formulated a test to determine whether nonliteral
elements of a computer program are copyright protectable and then applied that test to the
instant fact pattern clearly indicates that the Second Circuit believed that nonliteral elements
could be copyright protectable.
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overview of computer programs. Part II presents a brief history of the
relevant technology, examines the protection of nonliteral elements
of literary works under copyright law, and outlines the copyright
treatment of nonliteral elements of computer programs prior to
Lotus. Part III outlines the procedural history of Lotus and details the
holding of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in that case. Part
IV examines the current status of the law. Lastly, Part V thoroughly
analyzes the conclusions and reasoning of the circuit court's opinion
in Lotus. Part V demonstrates the appropriateness of the circuit
court's holding and looks at its implications for the copyright
protection of nonliteral elements of computer programs.
I. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
The Copyright Act defines a computer program as "a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result. ' 14 Although not
inaccurate, this definition does not explain enough to analyze the
issues raised by Lotus. At its lowest level, a computer program is a
collection of discrete voltage states that constitute a series of
instructions that when executed will cause a computer to do
something. Human beings conceive of these voltage states as zeros
and ones to make this process more readily understandable. The
zeros and ones are in reality metaphors for the underlying low
voltages and high voltages. A series of zeros and ones in a specific
order constitutes an instruction to the computer.15 Programmers
entered the very first computer programs as strings of ones and zeros,
or binary. 6 Because this process was extremely labor intensive,
programmers developed tools to allow the writing of computer
programs in higher level computer languages that more closely
resemble human language. Using terms such as "if," "else," "begin,"
"end," and assorted mathematical and logical operators, computer
programmers are more easily able to create large programs. The text
that represents the computer program in this form is called "source
14. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
15. For example, on an Intel 8086 microprocessor, the binary sequence "10011001" tells
the computer to execute a CWD, or Convert Word to Double, instruction. See STEPHEN P.
MORSE, THE 8086/8088 PRIMER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEIR ARCHITECTURE, SYSTEM
DESIGN, AND PROGRAMMING 54 (2d ed. 1982).
16. The numbering system which consists of only zeros and ones is called binary, or base
two. Information on a computer is represented by a sequence of two distinct voltage states,
which in turn are represented by zeros and ones. See id. at 3-4.
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code." The source code is fed into a special computer program, called
a compiler, that translates each line of source code into the actual

instructions to the computer that it represents. This binary output
from the compiler is called "object code." Computers only run
programs in binary form.17 Computer programmers can write source
code in a high-level language such as C++ or Pascal, in which each
line of source code represents multiple instructions to the computer,

or in assembly language, in which, generally, each line of source code
represents one actual instruction to the computer.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. BriefHistory of Relevant Technology
Today, corporations utilize computers heavily, and the sale of

commercial software is an enormous business. Consequently, the
legislative and judicial classification and treatment of computer

programs is an issue of enormous legal and economic importance.
Yet, computer use became very widespread in a relatively short

period of time.18 In the 1950s, state of the art computers cost millions
of dollars and took up multiple rooms. 19 With the introduction of the
integrated circuit20 in 195921 and the subsequent development of the

microprocessor 22-which

was first commercially utilized in 1970 by

the now famous Intel corporation 23-computers
24
smaller, cheaper, and much more powerful.

quickly became

17. I have intentionally avoided an explanation of linking and nonexecutable object
modules versus executable images. Such distinctions are important generally, but are outside the
scope of this comment.
18. The first viable electronic computer, the ENIAC, was completed in 1945. See JON
PALFREMAN & DORN SWADE, THE DREAM MACHINE: EXPLORING THE COMPUTER AGE 8,44
(1991). It was one hundred feet long, eight feet high, three feet deep, weighed thirty tons, and
contained 18,000 vacuum tubes. See id. at 44. It cost 500,000 1945 dollars. See id.
19. See MORSE, supra note 15, at 8.
20. An integrated circuit ("IC," or chip) is the combination of many separate electronic
components, such as transistors, resistors, and capacitors, into a single complex electronic
circuit, fixed on a wafer of silicon. See id.
21. See PALFREMAN & SWADE, supra note 18, at 91.
22. A microprocessor is a single integrated circuit that contains all of the components
necessary to constitute the control unit of a general purpose programmable computer. A
microprocessor is sometimes called "a computer on a chip." See MORSE, supra note 15, at 8;
PALFREMAN & SWADE, supra note 18, at 107.
23. See PALFREMAN & SWADE, supra note 18, at 107.
24. The Altair, the first computer built around a microprocessor and available for personal
home use, was offered for sale in 1975. See id. at 109. It cost 500 1975 dollars. See id. It was
advertised for sale in Popular Mechanics magazine, essentially as a toy for hobbyists. See id.
Today, a computer with hundreds or even thousands of times more computing power than the
computers that controlled the Apollo space flights to the moon can be purchased for a thousand
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Technology changes more quickly than law. The legal system
addresses new technologies by attempting to analogize them to things
for which legal rules already exist. The Copyright Act and its
associated legislative history classify computer programs as literary
5
works and, thus, extend copyright protection to computer programs
This legal classification, while not necessarily inappropriate, requires
courts to perform some new analysis since computer programs are in
various ways different from traditional literary works.
B. Copyright Protectionfor Nonliteral Elements of Literary Works
Copyright infringement of literary works is not limited to a
copying of the words but can also be achieved by a copying of
nonliteral elements, such as plots or characters. Courts have long held
that the copying of nonliteral elements of literary works can
constitute copyright infringement. For example, in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp.,26 Judge Learned Hand stated that
"[copyright protection] cannot be limited literally to the text, else a
plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. ' 27 Nichols concerned nonliteral similarities between two plays3 8 In Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc. ,29 the Ninth Circuit found that
plot similarities between Battlestar Galactica and Star Wars could
constitute the basis for a finding of copyright infringement.30 In Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Productions,Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,3 the
Ninth Circuit held copyright infringing similarities between the
McDonaldland characters and the characters from the H.R. Pufnstuf
television program were established by the "'total concept and feel'
32
of the productions.
In Nichols, Judge Hand acknowledged that determining where
the copying of nonliteral elements constitutes copyright infringement
is an amorphous process.33 As Judge Hand eloquently phrased the
issue, "as soon as literal appropriation ceases to be the test, the whole
dollars.
25. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
26. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
27. Id. at 121.
28. See id. at 120.
29. 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983).
30. See id. at 1329.
31. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
32. See id. at 1167 (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1970)).
33. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
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matter is necessarily at large." 4 The difficulty is manifested in
attempting to distinguish between protectable expression and a
nonprotectable idea. Judge Hand enunciated the following test for
attempting to make this determination:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended."
This abstraction test attempts to isolate protectable expression that
exists in the gray area between the literal elements of a work and the
nonprotectable ideas of the work. Judge Hand instructed that the line
beyond which protection does not exist is not a bright one. Referring
to the point at which expression merges with idea, Judge Hand stated,
"Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever
36

can."

C. CopyrightProtectionfor NonliteralElements of Computer
ProgramsPriorto Lotus
The classification of computer programs as literary works has
resulted in some confusion as to where copyright protection is
appropriate for the nonliteral elements of computer programs.
Computer programs are legally classified as literary works and, as
such, are the subject of copyright protection. The literal elements of a
computer program consist of the source code and the object code.37
The copying of the code of a computer program is analogous to the
copying of the words of a traditional literary work. However, as
courts have extended copyright protection to the nonliteral elements
of traditional literary works, courts have extended copyright
protection to the nonliteral elements of computer programs as well.
In 1986 in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc. ,38 the Third Circuit performed the first thorough copyright
infringement analysis of the copying of nonliteral elements of
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
ld.
Id.
See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992).
797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986).
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computer programs. In the facts of Whelan, the Jaslow Dental
Laboratory hired the Strohl Systems group to write a computer
39
program to automate certain business functions of the laboratory.
The agreement between the parties stated that Strohl would retain
ownership of the software it developed for Jaslow. 40 Pursuant to this
agreement, Strohl officer and half owner Elaine Whelan developed
the Dentalab computer program for use by Jaslow. 41 Whelan left
Strohl and formed Whelan Associates, which acquired Strohl's
interest in the Dentalab program. 2 While using the Dentalab
software, Jaslow proceeded to write the Dentcomm computer
program.43 Dentcomm was functionally similar to Dentalab, but
Jaslow wrote it in a different programming language 44 with the45
intention of making it usable on a wider variety of computers.
Jaslow terminated its business relationship with Whelan 46 and began
marketing the Dentcomm software.4 Consequently, Whelan brought
an action alleging that the Dentcomm computer program infringed
Whelan's copyright in Dentalab. 48
The district court found that Jaslow did not copy the Dentalab
source code and that Jaslow even wrote the allegedly infringing
computer program in a different programming language. 49 Nonetheless, the district court held that the structure and organization of the
two computer programs were substantially similar.50 The district court
found that Dentcomm infringed Whelan's copyright in Dentalab
because the two programs were substantially similar and because
Jaslow had access to Whelan's computer program.5 To determine
that copyright infringement had occurred, the district court used a
traditional "access plus substantial similarity" test, but with expert
52
testimony to establish the existence of the substantial similarity.
39. See id. at 1225.
40. See id. at 1225 n.2.
41. See id. at 1225-26.
42. See id. at 1226.
43. See id.
44. Strohl Systems wrote Dentalab in EDL (Event Driven Language). See id. at 1226.
Jaslow wrote Dentcomm in BASIC. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1226-27.
48. See id. at 1227.
49. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1320-21 (E.D.
Pa. 1985), affd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
50. See id. at 1322.
51. See id. at 1321-22.
52. See id. at 1316, 1321-22.
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding of copyright infringement. 53 The court
explicitly held that copyright protection for computer programs
extends to the nonliteral structural and organizational elements of the
program and is not limited to a program's source or object code.5 4 In
its affirmation of the district court, the circuit court established a
methodology for distinguishing protectable expression from
nonprotectable ideas for utilitarian works such as computer programs. 55 Drawing on Baker v. Selden, 6 the court held that the purpose
of a utilitarian work is the idea of the work.57 Thus, it is appropriate to
articulate the purpose of the work, and then distinguish between the
elements that are necessary for the purpose and those that are not.58
The former elements are necessary for the idea of the work and, thus,
merge with the idea of the work.59 Therefore, they are not
copyrightable. 60 The latter elements are not part of the idea but
instead are expressions of the idea and, as such, are the subject of
copyright protection. 61 Under this reasoning, nonliteral elements of
computer programs are protectable where they are not needed to
achieve the program's desired result, but instead are either
superfluous or are among several possible ways of achieving that
62
desired result.
Initially, several district courts not under the jurisdiction of the
Third Circuit followed Whelan.63 Then in 1992, in Computer
Associates International,Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,61 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit rejected the Whelan test. The Second Circuit held
that Whelan falsely assumed that every computer program had only
one idea and that the Whelan court, through its misuse of terms of art,
had demonstrated a "flawed understanding of a computer program's

53. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1225 (3d Cir. 1986).
54. See id. at 1248.
55. See id. at 1235-38.
56. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
57. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 1238-40, 1248.
63. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 52 (D. Mass.
1990); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
64. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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method of operation."6 In the facts of Altai, Computer Associates
wrote a computer program called ADAPTER. 66 Computer Associates
wrote ADAPTER as a subprogram of a job scheduling program for
IBM mainframe computers called CA-SCHEDULER. 67 The CASCHEDULER program created and implemented a schedule
6
dictating when the computer should perform various operations. 8
The ADAPTER subprogram functioned as a translator program that
allowed CA-SCHEDULER to run on a variety of different computer
systems by translating the general directives of CA-SCHEDULER
into the specific instructions necessary to interact with the various
69
systems.
Altai had developed its own job scheduling program called
ZEKE.70 In order to develop its own adapter type translator program
for ZEKE, Altai hired Claude F. Arney, an employee of Computer
Associates.7 1 Arney had worked on ADAPTER for Computer
Associates.72 When Arney left Computer Associates to work for
Altai, he took copies of the ADAPTER source code.73 Arney wrote a
translator program called OSCAR 3.4 for Altai. 4 Without the
knowledge of anyone else at Altai, Arney copied portions of the
ADAPTER source code to create OSCAR 3.4.75 Arney copied
approximately thirty percent of the source code of OSCAR 3.4 from
ADAPTER.7 6 Computer Associates learned of this copying and
77
brought a copyright infringement action against Altai.
Upon learning of Arney's copying of the ADAPTER source
code, management at Altai initiated a rewrite of OSCAR. 71 Management removed all portions of OSCAR that had been copied from the
ADAPTER source code. 79 Altai brought in a team of eight computer
programmers who had not previously been involved in the project to
65.
66.
67.
6&
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 705-06.
See id. at 698.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 698-99.
See id. at 699.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 699-700.
See id. at 700.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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reconstruct the excised portions of OSCAR 3.4.80 Over a six month
period, this team replaced all of the sections of OSCAR 3.4 that
Arney had copied from the ADAPTER source code. 81 They did not
have access to the ADAPTER source code, but instead wrote original
source code to mimic the functionality of ADAPTER. 2 The resulting
program was called OSCAR 3.5.83 Altai took OSCAR 3.4 off the
84
market and sent copies of OSCAR 3.5 to all users of OSCAR 3.4.
Computer Associates alleged that both the copying of the
ADAPTER source code in OSCAR 3.4 and the copying of the
nonliteral elements of the ADAPTER program in OSCAR 3.5
infringed its copyright in ADAPTER. 85 The district court found that
the copying of the ADAPTER source code constituted infringement,
and Altai did not contest this finding.8 6 On the matter of the copying
of nonliteral elements, the district court found that no infringement
had occurred, and Computer Associates appealed. 87
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
holdings of the district court. 88 In so doing, the circuit court
established the A-F-C test for determining copyright infringement of
nonliteral elements of computer programs.8 9 The A-F-C test is
instructed by Judge Hand's abstraction analysis from Nichols.90 This
three-part test first involves abstracting backwards in stages from the
literal instructions of the allegedly infringing computer program, to
the components or subroutines of the program, to the design
documents and flowcharts describing the program, and eventually to
the function or purpose of the program, separated from the program
itself.91 Once the abstraction to the program's function has been
performed, the second step is to filter out any ideas, utility merged
into ideas, and other noncopyrightable material, such as that which
was taken from the public domain. 92 The third step is to compare
whatever protectable expression survived the filtration with the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 700-01.
See id. at 701.
See id.
See id. at 697.
See id. at 706-11.
See id. at 706-07.
See id.
See id. at 707-10.
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allegedly infringed work for substantial similarity. 93 Although this
standard clearly allows for the possibility of copyright protection for
nonliteral elements of computer programs, the court recognized that
the level of protection that exists might be minimal and that the issue
is a vague one requiring further development over time. The court
stated:
To be frank, the exact contours of copyright protection for nonliteral program structure are not completely clear. We trust that as
future cases are decided, those limits will become better defined.
Indeed, it may well be that the Copyright Act serves as a relatively
weak barrier against public access to the theoretical interstices
behind a program's source and object codes. 94
Interestingly, the Second Circuit found that the copying of nonliteral
elements of the computer program in the instant case did not
constitute copyright infringement. 95
The Second Circuit's holding in Altai has been extremely
influential in the other circuits. Since Altai, every circuit that has
explicitly considered the question of copyright protection of nonliteral elements of computer programs has endorsed the A-F-C test, with
the exception of the First Circuit in Lotus. The Federal Circuit, 96 the
Fifth Circuit, 97 the Ninth Circuit, 98 the Tenth Circuit, 99 and the
Eleventh Circuit'0° endorsed the Altai test. The Third Circuit continues to maintain its test from Whelan. 10 The most substantial and
interesting move away from the A-F-C test as a means of determining
copyright infringement of nonliteral elements of computer programs
came in the First Circuit's holding in Lotus, which the next Part of
this comment considers in detail.

93. See id. at 710-11.
94. Id. at 712.
95. See id. at 715.
96. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, 975 F.2d 832, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
97. See Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342-45 (5th
Cir. 1994).
98. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524-25 (9th Cir. 1992).
99. See Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997); Gates Rubber Co. v.
Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 841-42 (10th Cir. 1993).
100. See Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng'g, Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1555-56 (lth Cir. 1996);
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1543-45 (11th Cir. 1996).
101. See MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. WM. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769,
777 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991).
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III. THE LOTUS CASE
A. Facts
Lotus 1-2-3 is a computer spreadsheet program that allows users
to execute various accounting functions automatically on a computer. 10 2 Users operate the program through a series of menu commands
associated with certain functions, such as "Copy," "Print," or
"Quit."' 103 Users execute commands by selecting them on the screen or
by typing their first letter. 10 Lotus 1-2-3 has a total of 469 commands,
arranged hierarchically into more than fifty menus and submenus.' 0°
Lotus 1-2-3 allows users to write macros, which are simple
programs consisting of a series of commands. The user describes a
consecutive series of commands and saves the information in a file.
The user may then run these commands by typing a single keystroke,
rather than executing each command individually. Lotus 1-2-3
10 6
includes the ability to read and execute such macros.
In 1987, Borland International released Quattro, a different and
competing spreadsheet program. 0 7 Quattro was developed by
programmers at Borland without access to the 1-2-3 source code.
Quattro includes a great deal of functionality not present in 1-2-3.1°8
Additionally, Quattro includes "'a virtually identical copy of the
entire 1-2-3 menu tree,"' 0 9 as well as the ability to read and execute
Lotus macros. Borland did not copy any of the Lotus source code, but
instead wrote its own program to mimic the Lotus menu." 0 This was
done so that users already familiar with the Lotus menu could use
Quattro without having to learn a new menu system."' Quattro also
provided a completely different menu of its own."2

102. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 809 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an
equally divided Court,516 U.S. 233 (1996).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 810.
10& See id.
109. Id. (quoting Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202, 212 (D. Mass.
1993), rev'd, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996)).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
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B. ProceduralHistory
On June 28, 1990, in the separate case of Lotus Development
Corp. v. Paperback Software International,"' the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the Lotus
1-2-3 menu structure was expression protected by copyright." The
next day, Borland filed a declaratory judgment action against Lotus in
the Northern District of California, seeking a declaration of
noninfringement. 11 Three days later, on July 2, 1990, Lotus brought
an action against Borland in the District of Massachusetts for
infringement of copyright.1 6 On September 10, 1990, the district court
in California dismissed Borland's declaratory judgment in favor of the
17
infringement action.
Lotus and Borland both moved for summary judgment, and both
motions were denied on March 20, 1992.118 However, the district court
invited the parties to file renewed "better focus[ed]" summary
judgment motions." 9 On April 24, 1992, both parties filed new
summary judgment motions. 120 Borland claimed that the Lotus 1-2-3
menus were not copyrightable as a matter of law. 21 Lotus claimed
that Borland had copied the entire 1-2-3 user interface, thereby
122
infringing Lotus' copyrights.
On July 31, 1992, the district court denied Borland's motion for
summary judgment and granted Lotus' summary judgment motion in
part. 2 3 The court reasoned that the 1-2-3 menu hierarchy is
copyrightable expression because various other menu hierarchies are
possible for spreadsheet programs. 2 4 The court, however, held that a
reasonable jury could conclude that Borland had not copied the
entirety of the 1-2-3 menu, as Lotus had claimed.25 The court
concluded that Borland had infringed Lotus' copyright based on the
extent to which Borland had copied expressive elements of the 1-2-3
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
See id. at 68.
See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 807.
See id.
See id.
See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D. Mass. 1992).
See id. at 82.
See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810.
See id.
See id.
See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992).
See id. at 217.
See id. at 209.
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menu structure that are integral parts of Lotus 1-2-3.126 The court
further concluded that a jury trial was necessary to determine the
amount of protected expression that Borland had actually copied. 127
Following the district court's grant of partial summary judgment
for Lotus, Borland removed the Lotus emulation menu from its
Quattro program. 128 Borland did, however, retain in Quattro the
capability to run Lotus macros. 129 Consequently, the district court
permitted Lotus to file an additional complaint claiming that
Borland's inclusion of the macro running functionality in Quattro
infringed the Lotus 1-2-3 copyright. 130 The parties agreed to try the
outstanding issues without a jury."3 The district court held two trials.
The first trial considered the extent to which Borland copied the
Lotus 1-2-3 menu. 13 2 The second trial addressed the issues of the
supplemental complaint concerning infringement by Borland's Lotus
1 33
1-2-3 macro reader, which Borland called "Key Reader.'
In the first trial, the district court held that "each of the Borland
emulation interfaces contains a virtually identical copy of the 1-2-3
menu tree and that the 1-2-3 menu tree is capable of a wide variety of
expression.113 4 In the second trial, the district court held that
Borland's Key Reader. infringes Lotus' copyright. 135 The court held
136
that the Key Reader included the Lotus 1-2-3 menu tree structure,'
which is a protectable element of Lotus 1-2-3.137 The district court
issued a permanent injunction against Borland.138 Borland proceeded
to appeal. The issue considered on appeal was Borland's copying of
39
the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy.

126. See id. at 223.
127. See id.
128. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 811 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an
equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
129. See id. at 811-12.
130. See id. at 812.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202, 218 (D. Mass. 1993), rev'd, 49
F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff.d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
135. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 223, 245 (D. Mass. 1993), rev'd,
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
136. See id. at 228.
137. See id. at 233.
138. See id. at 245.
139. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 812 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an
equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
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C. The Holding of the Courtof Appeals for the First Circuit
On appeal, Borland did not dispute that Lotus held a valid
copyright on the Lotus 1-2-3 program as a whole.140 Borland conceded
further that it had copied the menu command hierarchy of Lotus
1-2-3.141 In its defense, Borland argued that it had not infringed Lotus'
copyright because the menu command hierarchy is not protectable
42
because it is a system, method of operation, process, or procedure,
all of which are excluded from copyright protection by the Copyright
Act. 43 The First Circuit stated that the question before the court was
whether "a menu command hierarchy standing on its own ... without
other elements of the user interface, such as screen displays"
constitutes copyrightable subject matter. 144
The First Circuit considered the applicability of the Second
Circuit's A-F-C test. 145 The court acknowledged that the Second
Circuit's test might be appropriate for determining the nonliteral
copying of a computer program's code but held that it was not
applicable to the instant case. 146 The court reasoned that Borland's
copying from Lotus was not "nonliteral copying of computer code,"
'147
but "literal copying of... [a] menu command hierarchy.'
The First Circuit held that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is
a nonprotectable method of operation. 48 The court found that the
menu command hierarchy is the method by which the program is
controlled. 149 The concurring judge analogized the menu command
hierarchy to the buttons on a video cassette recorder'50 and to the
layout of the keys on a typewriter. 5'
The court distinguished between the menu hierarchy itself,
through which the user controls the software, and the screen displays,
which the user views but does not actually use to manipulate the
program. 52 The court rejected the district court's assertion that the
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See id. at 813.
See id.
See id. at 812.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 813.
See id. at 814-15.
See id. at 815.
Id. at 814.
See id. at 815.
See id.
See id. at 817 (Boudin, J., concurring).
See id. at 819-20 (Boudin, J., concurring).
See id. at 815-16.
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specific arrangement of the menu command hierarchy constitutes a
protectable expression of an idea. 153 The court held that the menu
command hierarchy is the means by which a program is operated and,
as such, is a nonprotectable method of operation, regardless of the
fact that it could have been designed differently and that other
14
arrangements for menu command hierarchies exist beside this one.
D. The Supreme Court's Sparse Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari1 55 and proceeded to affirm
the decision of the First Circuit in a two sentence opinion stating only:
"The Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Stevens took
16
no part in the consideration or decision of this case.'
IV.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW

The holding in Lotus can be interpreted to indicate that the
copying of nonliteral elements of computer programs can never
constitute copyright infringement. However, despite the Supreme
Court's affirmation of Lotus, three circuits have subsequently
endorsed the A-F-C test for determining copyright infringement for
the copying of nonliteral elements of computer programs.
In Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical & Scientific Communications,
Inc., 157 the Second Circuit held that "[i]t is well established in this
Circuit that nonliteral similarity of computer programs can constitute
copyright infringement.' 51 8 The Second Circuit proceeded to cite the
A-F-C test established in Altai as the proper means for determining
such infringement. 5 9 Thus, the Second Circuit, as the originator of the
A-F-C test, was not persuaded by the analysis of the First Circuit in
Lotus.
In Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc.,160 the Tenth Circuit explicitly declined

to follow Lotus and held that despite the wording of the Copyright
Act, elements of a method of operation may be subject to copyright
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id. at 816.
See id.
See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 515 U.S. 1191 (1995).
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
118 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 963.
See id.
124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
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protection.161 Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit found no elements so
162
protectable in the case at bar.
In Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc.,163 the Eleventh Circuit endorsed
the A-F-C test. 164 More recently, in Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce
Engineering Co.,165 the Eleventh Circuit found that a specific
computer program's menu structure was a process and, thus, not
eligible for copyright protection. 66 The Mitek court did not go so far
as to hold that software menus are noncopyrightable processes as a
167
matter of law.
V. ANALYSIS

A. Lotus as a Rejection of Copyright Protectionfor the Copying of
NonliteralElements of Computer Programs
Despite the continued use of the A-F-C test by some circuits,
Lotus raises the interesting question of whether the copying of
nonliteral elements of computer programs can ever constitute
copyright infringement. Although the Lotus court does not explicitly
state that it cannot, its analysis logically suggests that with an
exception for artistic screen images, which are protectable as
audiovisual works, copying of nonliteral elements of computer
programs never infringes current copyright laws.'6 The Lotus court
classified the copying at bar as the "literal copying of ...[a] menu
command hierarchy" as distinguished from "the nonliteral copying of
computer code.' 1 69 It is important, therefore, to examine the exact
nature of the copying in Lotus.
It is not contested that Borland did not copy the underlying code
of the Lotus 1-2-3 computer program. 70 Such copying would
constitute infringement and would be actionable.' 7 ' Instead, Borland
wrote its own computer program which mimicked both specific visual
161. See id. at 1372.
162. See id. at 1376.
163. 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996).
164. See id. at 1543-45.
165. 89 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1996).
166. See id. at 1557.
167. See id.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 140-54.
169. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an
equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
170. See id. at 816.
171. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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and nonvisual components of the Lotus program. Borland simulated
both the appearance and behavior of the Lotus menu system and the
Lotus macro reader. Without access to the source code for Lotus
1-2-3, Borland wrote a computer program to do exactly what parts of
the Lotus program do. The parts of Lotus 1-2-3 simulated by Borland,
the menu hierarchy and the macro reader, constitute the way in which
a user operates Lotus 1-2-3. Thus, the court chose to classify the
writing of a work-alike menu and macro reader as a literal copying of
that method of operation. 172 This is not inaccurate, but it is not the
whole story.
The terms "literal copying" and "the copying of literal elements"
are often used interchangeably but in fact have different meanings.
Likewise, the terms "nonliteral copying" and "the copying of
nonliteral elements" are often mistakenly used interchangeably. In
the instant case, the source code that generates the Lotus 1-2-3 menu
hierarchy is a literal element of a computer program. A literal
copying of each line of that code would constitute copyright
infringement. Less obviously but equally accurately, a nonliteral
copying of the source code (a literal element) could also constitute
copyright infringement. If a plagiarist with access to the source code
made a copy with intentional minor variations, the result would
constitute a nonliteral copy of a literal element. Such nonliteral
copying of source code is analogous to the copying of text with the
substitution of synonyms for some of the original words.
The copying of nonliteral elements can also be literal or
nonliteral. The idea of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu hierarchy is a nonliteral
element of the Lotus 1-2-3 program, distinguishable from the
expression of that idea fixed in source code. A work-alike program is
a literal copying of the underlying idea (a nonliteral element) of the
original program. Nonliteral elements could also be copied
nonliterally, by the writing of a program that imitates the original
program less exactly. The Lotus appellate court was entirely correct
in stating that the copying at bar was the literal copying of a method
of operation, and not the nonliteral copying of code. The copying in
Lotus was also not the literal copying of computer code. The copying
was not literal or nonliteral copying of literal elements of Lotus 1-2-3
but instead was the literal copying of nonliteral elements.
It is of legal significance that the court held that the nonliteral
elements that were copied constituted a nonprotectable method of
172. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 814.
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operation. It is well established that although original expressions of
ideas are protectable by copyright, there is no copyright protection
for ideas themselves.1 73 The fact that there is no copyright protection
for "any idea," as well as for any "procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery" is also articulated in
section 102(b) of the Copyright Act. 74 The legislative history of the
Copyright Act indicates that the exceptions to copyright protection
listed in section 102(b) are a legislative codification of the ideaexpression dichotomy associated with Baker v. Selden.1 75 Thus, it is
entirely accurate and noncontroversial to state, as the Lotus court did,
that the copying of an idea (or any of the extensions of an idea
articulated in section 102(b) of Copyright Act) does not constitute
copyright infringement. I believe further that the copying of
nonliteral elements of computer programs will always be reducible to
the copying of ideas or to one of the section 102(b) idea-related
categories.
To defend this thesis, it is necessary to examine carefully the
nature of the elements that were copied in Lotus. It is easy to confuse
the screen images that a computer program generates with the
nonvisual components of the program. Borland wrote code to
simulate both visual and nonvisual elements of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu
hierarchy. The court in Lotus articulated that the issue at bar was not
the copying of the screen displays but the copying of the underlying
menu command hierarchy, independent of any visual screen
representation thereof. 7 6 The court specifically declined to take a
position on whether the screen images could be the subject matter of
copyright protection.177 Subsection D of this Part analyzes screen
displays generated by computer programs in detail. At present, it is
important to note that both the visual and nonvisual aspects of the
Lotus 1-2-3 command hierarchy are nonliteral elements of the Lotus
1-2-3 program, distinguishable from the source code that generates
them. The First Circuit considered only the copying of the nonvisual
elements of the menu hierarchy.
What Borland copied was not the actual instructions to the
computer that result in Lotus' manifestation of the 1-2-3 menu
hierarchy, but instead the structure behind parts of the Lotus
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See
See
See
See
See

generally Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670.
Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815-16.
id. at 816 n.10.
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program-the hierarchy and functionality that constitute the Lotus
1-2-3 menu system and macro command reader. The court of appeals
correctly held that this structure is reducible to a method of
operation. Computer programs are utilitarian works created not as
artistic expression (although certainly the craft of computer
programming is not without creativity) but solely in order to perform
some function or functions. Thus, it seems that every part of a
computer program except the instructions is an idea, method of
operation, system, or process. Unlike traditional literary works,
nonliteral elements of computer programs cannot be isolated from
the literal elements in any form more tangible than that of idea. As
Judge Hand articulated in Nichols, a traditional literary work can
contain a copyright protectable gray area somewhere between the
literal elements and the ideas. 7 Computer programs have no such
gray area. The only nonliteral elements that can be extracted from
computer programs are ideas. The elements of authorship that infuse
computer programs with the creative originality required for
copyright protection as literary works are fleeting and can be fixed
only as code.
Just as Borland did not infringe Lotus' copyright by writing a
program that mimicked parts of Lotus 1-2-3, Borland arguably would
not have infringed Lotus' copyright if it had written a program that
mimicked every functional aspect of Lotus 1-2-3 but without copying
any of the underlying code. Perhaps if the Supreme Court had been
more verbose in its affirmation of Lotus, this would be clearly
established as a matter of law today.
B. Lotus as a Rejection of the Whelan Test
Conceivably, this comment's reading of Lotus may be too broad,
and under certain circumstances the copying of nonliteral elements of
computer programs should still constitute infringement. At the very
least, however, the Lotus court clearly rejected the already widely
criticized Whelan test by holding that the existence of multiple ways
of performing a function does not allow copyright protection for that
which is otherwise nonprotectable. 7 9 The Whelan court seems to have
misapplied the merger doctrine associated with the idea-expression
dichotomy.

178. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
179. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 816.
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The merger doctrine provides that where only a limited number
of ways of expressing an idea exist, the expression of that idea merges
with the idea and, like the idea itself, is removed from the realm of
copyright monopoly. 11° However, this does not imply automatic
copyright protection for anything that can be expressed in multiple
ways. Numerous ways exist to express various facts, ideas, methods of
operation, and the like, for which copyright protection simply does
not exist regardless of the number of methods of expression possible.
As the Lotus court pointed out, the fact that Borland could have
labeled Quattro's copy functionality "Clone, Ditto, Duplicate,
Imitate, Mimic, Replicate, [or] Reproduce" instead of "Copy" 181 in no
way "magically change[s] the noncopyrightable menu command
hierarchy into copyrightable subject matter."' 182
The Supreme Court's affirmation of Lotus should be read as the
pounding of another nail into the Whelan test's coffin. It would have
been desirable for the Supreme Court to have taken the opportunity
to overrule the Third's Circuit's misapplication of the merger doctrine
as a standard for determining software infringement.
C. The Abstraction-Filtration-ComparisonTest after Lotus
The Lotus court indirectly acknowledged the Second Circuit's
A-F-C test 183 by stating that the test may be useful for determining
nonliteral copying of a computer program's code, 184 but found the test
inapplicable to the instant case.'85 The Lotus court held that not only
would the A-F-C test not be helpful in determining whether the
copying of a menu hierarchy constituted copyright infringement, but
that the test might actually be misleading.' 86 Concerning the A-F-C
test, the court stated:
[11n instructing courts to abstract the various levels, it seems to
encourage them to find a base level that includes copyrightable
subject matter .... We think that abstracting menu command
hierarchies down to their individual word and menu levels and then
filtering idea from expression at that stage, as... the Altai... test[]
require[s], obscures the more fundamental question of whether a
menu command hierarchy can be copyrightable at all. The initial
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
Lotus, 49 F.3d at 811.
Id. at 816.
See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815.
See id.
See id.
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inquiry should not be whether individual components of a menu
command hierarchy are expressive, but rather whether
the menu
187
command hierarchy as a whole can be copyrighted.
Thus, the First Circuit's refusal to apply the A-F-C test to determine
the copyrightability of nonliteral elements of computer programs
might well be read as an indirect rejection of that test. The Lotus
court chose not to abstract nonliteral elements to higher levels, but
instead to focus on the copyrightability of the nonliteral elements
themselves. The court held that the process of abstracting nonliteral
elements may be misleading because it falsely implies that protectable
expression necessarily exists within these elements. However, the
First Circuit did not explicitly reject the A-F-C test for use under all
circumstances.
With this background, it is worthwhile to examine the Second
Circuit's test to consider if it is appropriate for determining the
protectability of nonliteral elements of computer programs and, if so,
whether any nonliteral element of any computer program could ever
be protectable under that test. As explained previously, the A-F-C
test involves abstracting from the most literal and basic elements of a
computer program-the actual instructions that constitute the
program-to the most general-the idea of a program to perform a
certain function. It is helpful and appropriate to think of computer
programs in these terms of abstraction, but once the abstraction and
filtration have been performed, the comparison will always come up
empty as far as protectable elements are concerned.
At its most basic level, a computer program is a logically
contiguous series of discrete voltage states capable of causing a
computer to do something. Abstracted backwards from that is the
source code. At these levels, it is not contested that a copying of the
expression constitutes infringement. Everything at a higher level of
abstraction than the code seems reducible to an idea, process, or
method of operation. Put simply, the idea of a computer program to
perform some function or operation is always a nonprotectable idea.
A specific implementation of that idea in source code is a protectable
literary work. For example, Lotus' source code for the 1-2-3 menu
hierarchy is protectable. The idea of the menu hierarchy, not only a
menu hierarchy in general, but the Lotus menu hierarchy specifically,
is not. If nonliteral components are never protectable after the
filtration required by the A-F-C test, then the fact that Lotus did not
187. Id.
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explicitly reject this test does not show that nonliteral elements of
computer programs will or should ever be the subject of copyright
protection.
The Altai court instructed future courts to dissect the structure of
computer programs by performing a conceptual reverse
engineering.188 The court discussed the identification of intermediate
steps in program development, such as modules, parameter lists,
design specifications, and flow-charts. 18 9 Despite the court's instructions, everything the court listed is either part of the source code or
an idea preceding any specific implementation of the program. It is
not insignificant that the Altai court found no protectable elements as
a result of performing the A-F-C test. 19° Arguably every element of
every computer program at a level of abstraction higher than the
source code is a nonprotectable idea, procedure, process, system, or
method of operation. The holding of the First Circuit in Lotus implied
this. The grant of certiorari shows that the Supreme Court views this
issue as important. It would have been beneficial if the Supreme
Court had elucidated this matter. In order to clarify the confusion and
disagreement that now exists in the circuits, the Supreme Court
should grant certiorari to another software copyright case. If
certiorari is granted, it would be appropriate for the Supreme Court
to hold that copyright protection for computer programs is limited to
protection against a copying of the code.
D. The Exception for Artistic Screen Images
As mentioned earlier, one element of computer programs other
than the code that can be protectable by copyright is artistic screen
images. Sufficiently artistic screen images generated by computer
programs are copyright protectable as audio-visual works.191 Such
screen images are not protectable as literal or nonliteral elements of
computer programs, but instead as audio-visual works separate from
the computer program that generated them.1 92
It is important to distinguish between computer screen images as
nonliteral elements of computer programs and sufficiently artistic,
188. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1992).
189. See id. at 697-98.
190. See id. at 714-15.
191. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982)
(distinguishing the audio-visual copyright in screen images from the literary work copyright in
the computer program that generates the screen images).
192. See id.
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computer-program-generated visual images as audio-visual works.
Computer programs can contain both visual and nonvisual nonliteral
elements. For example, the Lotus 1-2-3 menu hierarchy consists of
not only the nonvisual underlying structure but also the visual
manifestation of the menu hierarchy on a computer screen. Absent
sufficient creative originality, screen images generated by computer
programs are best classified solely as visual, nonliteral elements of
those programs. Courts should not extend copyright protection to
such images as components of literary works because they, like all
nonliteral elements of computer programs, will always be reducible to
ideas.
A computer screen image can also be conceived of as an
audiovisual work, severable from the associated computer program.
Thus, given the requisite level of creativity and originality, such
images are the subject of copyright protection as audiovisual works,
entirely separately from the computer program that generated
them. 193 They are subject to copyright protection for the same reasons
as audio-visual works fixed in more traditional media such as oil paint
on canvas.
The same standards of copyright protection should apply to
digital visual works as those fixed in more familiar media. It is unclear
exactly how much protection courts will allow over time, but the
contents of a computer screen should not be copyright protectable
per se. Instead, they should be subject to the same originality and
creativity requirements as other audiovisual works. 194 This form of
copyright protection of digital works survives Lotus, but it is a
separate issue from the copyright protection of computer programs.
E. The Appropriate Legal Treatment of Computer Programs
Some commentators have suggested that the legal system should
develop an entirely new method of protection for computer
programs, 195 but this is neither realistic nor necessary. The European
Union, Japan, and other members of the international community
have already followed the American example of extending copyright
protection to computer programs. 196 Difficulties raised by the legal
193. See id.
194. See generally Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
195. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).
196. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of
Copyright over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2559, 2559
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protection of computer programs should be solved within the realm
of copyright law if possible. 97 The unique nature of computer
programs certainly raises copyright complications. This comment's
reading of Lotus provides a solution.
The Whelan test mistook nonprotectable ideas for protectable
expression. The Altai test attempted to remedy this problem by
detailing a thoughtful process for filtering out all nonprotectable
elements of computer programs and leaving only that which is
protectable. Altai failed to realize, however, that only the code is
protectable. If the Altai test is applied correctly, no protectable
elements will survive the filtration step at a level of abstraction
beyond the source code. The copyright minimalist interpretation of
Lotus outlined in this comment provides the solution, and it does so
within the framework of existing copyright law. The object and source
code of computer programs are literary works, and a copying thereof
can constitute copyright infringement. Every element of a computer
program at a higher level of abstraction than the code is "an idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, [or] concept"19 and,
thus, is excluded from copyright protection under section 102(b) of
the Copyright Act.
CONCLUSION

Computer programs are legally classified as literary works and,
as such, are protected from a copying of their underlying code. 199 The
copying of nonliteral elements of traditional literary works can
constitute infringement.20 0 Consequently, courts have extended
copyright protection to the nonliteral elements of computer
programs. 201 Prior to Lotus, courts dissected nonliteral elements of
computer programs, searching for copyrightable material.202 In Lotus,
the First Circuit declined to engage in such analysis, and instead held
that specific nonliteral elements of a computer program constituted a
method of operation and, thus, were nonprotectable as a matter of
law.20 3 The Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit's opinion in
(1994);
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Samuelson et al., supra note 195, at 2348 n.146.
See generally Ginsburg, supra note 196.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
See supra note 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
See supra text accompanying note 62.
See id.
See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814-15 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by
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Lotus per curiam, by an equally divided Court. 2°4
Arguably, because computer programs are utilitarian works, all
of their nonliteral elements are reducible to ideas, procedures,
processes, systems, methods of operation, and concepts. The
Copyright Act exempts things so classified from protection. 2 5 Unlike
traditional literary works, computer programs have no gray area
between the ideas and the literal elements. The literary qualities of
computer programs are fleeting and can be fixed only as code. Every
element of a computer program severed from the code is an idea or is
in one of the Copyright Act section 102(b)'s idea-related categories.
Furthermore, the earlier tests that allowed copyright protection
for the copying of nonliteral elements of computer programs are
problematic. The Whelan test is a misapplication of the merger
doctrine and has been widely criticized as such. The Altai test, if
applied correctly, seems incapable of ever indicating actual
infringement. Arguably, no copying of computer programs other than
the copying of code should ever constitute copyright infringement.
Despite Lotus, many of the circuits continue to apply the Altai
test to determine copyright protection for nonliteral elements of
computer programs. The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to
another software copyright case and articulate a clear rule for the
copyright protection of computer programs. An appropriate rule
would be to limit copyright protection for computer programs to a
copying of the code.

an equally divided Court,516 U.S. 233 (1996).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
205. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).

